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Abstract
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1 Introduction
This paper reviews the branch of literature that applies tools developed in international trade theory to the
area of open macroeconomics. The contribution of this branch has been focused on attempts to bridge the
gap between international trade and international macro by giving precise micro-foundations to international
macro phenomena. This is challenging because trade models, which have so far abstracted from short-run
business cycle uctuations on prices and quantities, are dedicated to address the question why in the long-run
countries engage in the exchange of goods.
The methods of introducing dynamics into static trade equilibrium vary with di¤erent types of trade
models. The rst major shift in the frontier of international trade theory can be marked since the 80s when
then-prevailing traditional trade theory represented by the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin (henceforth H-O)
models give way to the New Trade Theory advocated by Krugman and Helpman. The previous shift was
from theories grounded in comparative advantage in terms of di¤erences in sector-specic input requirements
and endowment of production factors under perfect competition to those that explain intra-industry trade
accompanied by product di¤erentiation under monopolistic competition. In comparison, New New Trade
Theory, which is emerging in the latest shift, is characterized by the focus on intra-industry heterogeneity
(di¤erences observable even among rms belonging to the same sector). New New Trade Theory feature
can be analyzed in both New Trade Theory framework as in Melitz (2003) and traditional trade theory
framework as in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003). Whereas the earlier two lines of trade theory
(traditional and New) have a commonality in that they depend on the industry as a unit of analysis, the New
New Trade Theory examines rm-level variations in productivity. Scholars in the New New Trade Theory
model a situation in which a limited number of exporting rms and rms not engaged in global activities
coexist within a single industry accompanied by their considerable productivity gaps.
In traditional trade theory, allowing key production factor to accumulate over time (capital accumulation
through investment or labor knowledge evolvement and spillover) would extend traditional trade models
to their dynamic versions. They do provide some insight on the aggregate productivity growth, but they
are incapable of explaining short term macroeconomic uctuations. Two papers of this kind are briey
mentioned in section 3.1. New New Trade Theory models overcome this obstacle by introducing business
cycle productivity shocks at the country level, and they can further study long term technological progress
as in dynamic traditional trade models by adding costly innovation.
In the New New Trade Theory models built on New Trade Theory framework, countries are populated
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by consumers with identical CES preference are ex-ante identical, but they still trade for di¤erentiated
goods produced by heterogeneous rms with increasing returns to scale. All goods are substitutes to each
other, but are not exactly alike. This means the market structure is monopolistically competitive, where
many competing rms sell goods that are di¤erentiated from one another. Researchers add business cycle
productivity shock at the country level in this class of microeconomic models, and thus study aggregate
international relative price as well as exchange rate uctuation. Further, innovation option is introduced
into this kind of models and this new feature induces studies on aggregate productivity growth over time.
Section 2 reviews the development of adding another "New" to New Trade Theory in the introductory
remarks, and most importantly discusses in detail research papers that analyze open macroeconomic issues
on the basis of New New Trade Theory.
Another rising strand of research merges traditional trade theory with heterogeneous productivity charac-
teristic from the New New Trade Theory, and researchers develop a competing class of models comparing to
ones based on New Trade Theory. In typical New Trade Theory models, the world consists of two countries
with heterogeneous rms producing in each country and exporting to the other. Similarly in the competing
models, the world is populated by many countries with heterogeneous productivity in the same xed basket
of goods. The economy structures are alike in the two classications of models except for how rms or
countries compete. Monopolistic competition in the New Trade Theory models is replaced with the case of
perfect competition in Eaton and Kortum (2002) or Bertrand competition in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and
Kortum (2003). In section 3.2, I put more e¤orts on reviewing papers that merge New New Trade Theory
thoughts with tradition trade models, especially the Ricardian model.
Written in the style of a literature review, the aim of this term paper is to provide ideas for creative
works which will eventually become the second essay of my dissertation. My third year paper on private
borrowing and lending with default risk within and across border serves as the rst part.
2 New (New) Trade Theory
The so called New Trade Theory importantly departs from the traditional trade theory in the fact that
trading countries are ex-ante identical and atomistic rms are responsible for producing and exporting a
unique variety of goods. Iso-elastic preferences, monopolistic competition with di¤erentiated substitutes and
increasing return to scale due to xed export cost are three crucial ingredients for models of this kind. In
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Krugman (1980) and in a later extension by Krugman and Helpman (1985)1 , consumers have a preference for
variety and rms have identical productivity so that they all export if overhead cost fX for exporting is low
enough. Giving up autarky for trade is good because consumers get access to a wider range of di¤erentiated
goods. There also exists transportation cost, which means that one unit of good shipped abroad arrives only
a fraction 1 ; where  > 0: When trade costs (either variable transportation cost  or xed overhead cost)
go down, each exporter increases the volume of its exports, which is known as the intensive margin of trade.
All varieties are traded in Krugmans model, which contradicts with the observation that only a subset of
rms (varieties) actually trade internationally.
New New Trade Theory emerges to correct this shortcoming, Melitz (2003) combines Hopenhayns (1992)
model of heterogeneous rms in closed economy with krugmans theory. By doing this, he can account for
the stylized fact in trade data that rms widely di¤er in terms of size, productivity and exporting decisions.
Opening up to trade induces not only a boom in varieties but also an increase in aggregate productivity
through a more e¢ cient reallocation of labor. The existence of xed overhead export cost and heterogeneity
in productivity implies that only a subset of rms enter exporting markets. When trade barrier moves
downward, besides consumersgain in intensive margin, they also enjoy an enlargement of the set of exporters,
which is referred as the extensive margin of trade. The mark-ups are constant in both Krugmans (1980)
and Melitzs (2003) model, which is not realistic since rms do change mark-up in response to variations in
marginal costs.
To rene the approach, quite a few studies try to account for an endogenous determination of mark-
ups. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) replaced CES utility in Melitzs model with preferences developed in
Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), which gives a linear demand system. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and
Kortum (2003) instead keep the CES preferences assumption, but remove the monopolistic competition
assumption and replace it with the case of Bertrand competition in each industry. In addition to intensive
and extensive margin, there is another layer of benets with endogenous mark-ups even for less extreme
movements of trade barriers other than going from autarky to trade. Prices consumer pay will decrease since
mark-ups charged by rms will endogenously go down when trade barriers moves down. In their models,
heterogeneity in productivity, even in the absence of xed trade barriers, leads to an endogenous selection
1Helpman and Krugman (1985) extend Krugman (1980) to a two sector model, one sector is a homogeneous good that
is produced under constant returns to scale technology and is freely traded, and the other corresponds to a continuum of
di¤erentiated varieties, that are subject to both variable and xed costs. Provided this homogeneous good is produced in every
country, the wage will be constant and equal to 1 in every country.
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of rms into the export market.
In melitzs (2003) model, free entry condition brings in new varieties whenever new rms enter domestic
market and start producing. The innovation to create new rms (varieties) is thus called product innovation.
However, rms have to either live with their initial productivity draw forever or exit the market after they
enter the market. Several studies o¤er individual rms the opportunity of process innovation, and investigate
how trade liberalization a¤ect endogenous selection into exporting, innovation decisions and, consequently,
aggregate growth. Process innovation refers to investment designed to reduce marginal cost, thereby making
the rm more productive. Costantini and Melitz (2008) introduce a one-time binary technological upgrading
choice that raises the likelihood that the rm will realize higher levels of productivity in future. They then
examine the transition dynamics between two steady states from high to low trade costs, and nd that
productivity e¤ects depend on whether liberalization is anticipated and on how quickly it is implemented.
Atkeson and Burstein (2009) introduces innovation as both a continuous process and a continuous choice,
and show that a reduction in trade costs exerts a positive e¤ect on process innovation over time, which can be
o¤set by negative e¤ects on product innovation. Impullitti and Licandro (2009) build on endogenous mark-up
models with oligopoly competition, and studies how trade barrier movements a¤ect both rm selection and
innovation through the competition channel. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) explore the e¤ects of trade
liberalization on innovation and growth in models of expanding variety (Romer, 1990) with heterogeneous
rms. They show that a reduction in trade barriers can increase or decrease growth depending on the form
of knowledge spillovers in a separate innovation sector.
All the above basic models and their extensions in New New Trade Theory play key roles in explaining long
term uctuations (specialization of goods production) in aggregate trade ows, especially the intra industry
trade ows. In the main body of this section, I review papers which use new trade theoretical tools to study
much shorter term uctuations, for instance, price adjustment. I will mainly focus on three papers: Ghironi
and Melitz (2005), Atkeson and Burstein (2008), and Atkeson and Burstein (2009). The rst two papers will
be discussed in section 2.1 and 2.2 in detail, then a simplied version of Atkeson and Burstein (2009) paper
and their most important results are presented in section 2.3. Traditional theory attributes uctuations in
real exchange rates to changes in the relative price of goods in exogenously nontraded industries. Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) utilize the original Melitzs (2003) heterogeneous rm model to make the nontraded industries
endgenous, which enables them to explain exchange rate volatility in response to productivity shocks hitting
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all sectors within the country.2 Atkeson and Bursteins (2008) model is built on the second generation
of Melitzs (2003) model with endogenous mark-up. They go further by dissecting exchange rates into
di¤erent international relative price indices and deriving co-moving relations between them. Their results
match the empirical data well in a calibrated model. International trade models with heterogeneous rms
alone or heterogeneity plus oligopoly competition help to generate endogenously persistent deviations from
Purchasing Power Parity under productivity shock in open macroeconomics. Atkeson and Burstein (2009)
o¤er one-step process innovation option to individual rms in Melitzs (2003) model, which enables them to
explore the aggregate growth aspect in dynamic macroeconomics under the impacts of trade liberalization.
There are other studies that use heterogeneous rm model to macroeconomic elds. For example, Bilbiie,
Ghironi and Melitz (2007) apply the model to investigate real business cycle transmission with an endogenous
determination of the number of producers over the business cycle. Their framework predicts a pro-cyclical
number of producers and pro-cyclical prots even for preference specications that imply countercyclical
markups.
2.1 International Relative Price Fluctuations
Ghironi and Melitz (2005, henceforth GM) apply the New New Trade theoretical tools in Melitzs (2003,
henceforth M) model to provide a microeconomic foundation for real exchange rate behaviors in international
macroeconomics. Empirical nding states that economies with higher GDP per capita (or higher produc-
tivity) have higher prices. The fact behind that empirical result is probably that real exchange rate could
be a¤ected by productivity shocks, referred as the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect (henceforth HBS e¤ect).
Traditional explanation for HBS e¤ect is provided by Balassa and Samuelson who introduce an exogenous
non-traded sector. If the tradable sector in a country experiences productivity growth, then the relative price
of non tradable goods will rise, so that the aggregate price index in this economy will rise thus consumption
based real exchange rate (This notion is dened in equation (1) below) decreases. In the GM dynamic
model of trade, aggregate HBS e¤ect is generated through endogenous exporting decisions by heterogeneous
rm. The central result of GM is that a permanent increase in productivity results in a higher aggregate
price index and a lower consumption based real exchange rate in the country that experiences such higher
productivity relative to its trading partners.
2 In traditional theory, productivity shocks are not country wide, instead they are restricted in nontraded sectors to induce
changes in the relative price of nontraded goods.
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The basic unit is dollar in M model while in GM everything is expressed in units of home consumption
goods. In this paper, I change all the symbols and units in M model to corresponding ones in GM model
since it is much easier to compare the two models with consistent notations. All cost incurred are measured
in origin countrys currency. Firms in both models have to pay a xed entry cost fEt in exchange for a
productivity draw. fEt is sunk after new rms enter the market. The rst di¤erence between these two
models is that rms selling domestically in M have to pay a period-by-period xed cost while rms in GM
face no xed cost when serving domestic market, namely, fDt = 0.
3 Regardless the di¤erent treatment in
domestic production cost, both models require exporting rms to pay an extra cost fXt every period besides
the melting-iceberg cost  : All kinds of cost are given in e¤ective labor so that we have to transform them
into home consumption goods before using. There exists a basket of di¤erentiated goods 
; and each variety
is denoted by ! 2 
: c(!) is a representative agents consumption of goods !; and C denotes the aggregate
consumption of a basket of goods. At time t, aggregate consumption
Ct =
Z
!2
t
ct(!)
 1
 d!
 
 1
:
One can think of Ct as the period t utility from consuming all varieties, and  is consequently the elasticity
of substitution between di¤erentiated goods.  is identical across the world. The life time utility, especially
in GM, is
U = E0
" 1X
t=0
t
C1 t
1  
#
;
where  is the inverse of inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. For each variety !, demand function is
thus
ct(!) =

pt(!)
Pt
 
Ct;
where pt(!) is the home currency price for ! and Pt is aggregate price index. Single price and aggregate
price index are connected through the relationship below
Pt =
Z
!2
t
pt(!)
1 d!
 1
1 
:
Dene, separately, the expenditure rt(!) on each variety ! and total expenditure Rt on the consumption
3Any rm in GM, no matter how unproductive it is, will always produce domestically, and will only die of exogenous death.
This assumption assumes away the endogenous dynamics in total commodity set when Ghironi and Melitz introduce country
specic productivity shocks.
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basket as
rt(!) = pt(!)ct(!);
Rt = PtCt:
Production function is linear and labor is the only input,
qt = zZtlt   fDt ;
where a new entrant rms productivity draw is denoted by z.
Countries in the M model are identical while GM model considers the case of asymmetry, where countries
di¤er not only in population but also in aggregate labor productivity. The second additional feature Ghironi
and Melitz add into M model is thus Zt; the country-specic aggregate labor productivity, through which
asymmetric shocks at national level can be later introduced. One can think of GM model as a generalized
version of M model, in which Zt is the same as Zt and both of them equal to 1 in home and foreign countries.
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L (L) is the mass of domestic (foreign) workers. Let W (W ) be the domestic (foreign) nominal wage, and
dene wt = WtPt the real wage in home country. In M, home country nominal wageW is normalized to 1 since
only symmetric equilibria are considered, and then there is no role for relative wages adjustment. However,
in GM relative wage is the channel through which international relative price is a¤ected by productivity
shocks.
Qt is the consumption based real exchange rate (units of home consumption per unit of foreign consump-
tion) relying on ideal price indices Pt and P t
Qt = "t
P t
Pt
; (1)
where "t is the nominal exchange rate (units of home currency per unit of foreign currency). Ghironi and
Melitz use another consumption based real exchange rate depending on real price indices ePt and eP t to
explain their results. eQt = "t eP tePt ;
where Pt = N
1
1 
t
ePt, P t = N 11 t eP t and Nt (Nt ) denotes the number of rms producing at home (foreign)
country in equilibrium. Intuitively, eQt is the real exchange rate after getting rid of the dynamic impact from
goods variety set on ideal price indices. If we use the ideal price index to investigate the response of exchange
4The supercript star  means the same concept in foreign country in the rest of this section.
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rate on shock, then the increased availability of domestic varieties at home would unambiguously dominate
the increase in average prices, so that the domestic ideal price index would decrease relative to the foreign
one given there is a positive productivity shock at home.
Consider a rm with idiosyncratic labor productivity z operating in the domestic market. In M models
closed economy, the rm in focus would set price at8><>: p
D(z) =  1
W
z =

 1
1
z in home currency;
D(z) = p
D(z)
P =

 1
1
zP in home consumption goods,
and its corresponding net prot is8><>: 
D(z) = 1

pD(z)=P
1 
PC   fD in home currency;
dD(z) = 1

D(z)
1 
C   fDP in home consumption goods.
In GM model, since fD = 0 and time denoted by t matters now. The similar denitions for price and
prot are, respectively,8><>: p
D
t (z) =

 1
Wt
Ztz
in home currency;
Dt (z) =
pDt (z)
Pt
= WtZtzPt =
wt
Ztz
in home consumption goods,
and 8><>: 
D
t (z) =
1


pDt (z)=Pt
1 
PtCt in home currency;
dDt (z) =
1


Dt (z)
1 
Ct in home consumption goods.
What is more, in GM model rm z might turn out to be high productive, hence export with prots (measured
in home consumption goods) from international activities dened as
dXt (z) =
Qt


Xt (z)
1 
Ct  
wtf
X
t
Zt
;
where
Xt (z) =
pXt (z)
P t
=
1
Qt
 t
D
t (z)
and wtf
X
t
Zt
is the exporting overhead cost with units transformed from e¤ective labor to consumption goods.
All rms are divided into three categories: (I) rms with productivity draw below zmin do not produce at
all, (not applicable to GM since fD = 0) (II) rms with productivity between zmin and zXt only serve their
domestic market and (III) rms with productivity above zXt also export. The rst cuto¤ zmin is determined
by the zero domestic prot condition (zmin) = 0 in M model. In GM model since there is no overhead
cost in domestic production, zmin is exogenously given as the lower bound of support for the distribution
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from which entering rms draw productivity. The second cuto¤ zXt is determined by positive export prot
condition zXt = inf

z : dXt (z) > 0
	
: Suppose z is a draw from the distribution H(z). In equilibrium, all
rms producing in the domestic market have the distribution of productivity given by
g(z) =
8><>:
h(z)
1 H(zmin) if z > zmin;
= 0 otherwise.
And all domestic exporting rms have the distribution of productivity
gXt (z) =
8><>:
g(z)
1 G(zXt ) if z > z
X
t ;
= 0 otherwise.
In GM model, we can dene the average productivity of all rms serving domestic consumers as
ez = Z 1
zmin
z 1g(z)dz
 1
 1
;
where ez is time independent because zmin is exogenous. And the average productivity of all domestic rms
who export is
ezXt =
 Z 1
zXt
z 1gXt (z)dz
! 1
 1
:
Given these average productivities, the economy behaves as if there were Nt domestic producers with the
same productivity ez and NXt domestic exporters with productivity ezXt . Then the average total prots is
dt = d
D
t (ez) + [1 G(zXt )]dXt (ezXt ):
When a new entrant in GM model decides whether or not to pay sunk cost for one drawing opportunity, the
rm will write down its ex-ante discounted future prots as
vt = Et
" 1X
s=t+1
[ (1  )]s t

Cs
Ct
 
dt
#
;
where  denotes the probability of death shock to active rms.
To complete the GM model, three conditions are needed to characterize the equilibrium of their economy.
 Zero cuto¤ prots condition
dt = d
D
t (ez) + [1 G(zXt )]dXt (ezXt ):
The average productivity of all domestic rms ez is exogenously given in GM since ez is a function of
zmin. The zero cuto¤ condition thus relates two unknowns, dt and wt. Notice that nominal wage Wt
can not be normalized to 1 in GM with an asymmetric country setup.
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 Free entry condition
vt =
wtf
E
t
Zt
:
Potential rms are indi¤erent between staying out of and entering the market. This condition together
with the zero cuto¤ condition above give us solutions for dt and wt
 Labor market clearing condition
Rt =WtL:
Labor market clearing is the equilibrium condition that equates total expenditure to total revenue,
which will determine the total number of domestic rms Nt:
GM model is essentially a dynamic problem with total home rm number the state variable. The total
number of domestic rms must equal the number of surviving rms from last period plus the number of new
entrants in this period.
Nt = (1  )Nt 1 +NEt :
The stationary steady state in GM is just an extension of Ms model, where the total number of rms
producing domestically stays the same over time. In other words, every dying rm is replaced by a new
entrant.
N = NE :
Ghironi and Melitz also investigate the non-stationary equilibrium through the tool of numerical simulation.
The main nding in GM is that the redened consumption based real exchange rate, eQt; responds to
productivity shock Zt because of the free-entry condition of domestic rms. In the steady state equilibrium,
free entry condition a¤ects exchange rate through three channels. The rst two are related to wage that is
driven up by endogenous entry of rms. And the last channel is about consumer utility function. The empir-
ical evidence is that more productive economies (more productive across all sectors) have higher aggregate
price levels. Assume that a positive productivity shock a¤ects all rms in home country (for example, a 1%
rise in Z).
 The home market being more productive, more rms want to enter and produce here. If wages did not
adjust, all rms would locate at home. To keep foreign labor employed, domestic relative wages have to
rise. This is an appreciation in the "terms of labor". This induces the price of domestic goods (in units
of wage per e¤ective labor) to go up. Due to the presence of trade barriers, consumers spend more
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income on domestically produced goods than on foreign goods (since we are using constant elasticity
specication for utility function). This rise will further induce an increase in the price of home non
traded goods relative to foreign non traded goods. That is the rst channel through which the domestic
real exchange rate appreciates.
 Because domestic labor is more expensive as wage goes up, domestic rms are less protable in the
export market (the domestic terms of trade deteriorate). Hence, the productivity cuto¤ for exporting
goes up, only the most productive rms can keep exporting. Symmetrically, it becomes easier for foreign
rms to export, and more foreign rms start exporting due to a lower cuto¤ abroad. This increase in
the domestic wages has changed endogenously the set of exporters in both countries. Less productive
rms charge a higher price than more productive rms. So on average domestic imports become more
expensive, whereas domestic exports become cheaper. Hence, domestic consumers now consume on
average more expensive imports, whereas foreign consumers now consume on average cheaper imports.
This is the second channel through which the domestic real exchange rate appreciates.
 Finally, as more rms enter the domestic market, there are more domestic varieties available for
domestic consumers. Because consumers value variety, this induces domestic consumers to switch
their expenditure towards new home goods produced by newly entrants. Because domestic varieties
are more expensive, this further increases the price of the consumption basket of domestic consumers.
This is that last e¤ect through which the real exchange rate appreciates.
2.2 International Relative Price Co-movements
Built on Melitzs export selection mechanism plus endogenous mark-up, Atkeson and Burstein (2008, hence-
forth AB) remove the assumptions on free entry and exogenous death, and thus study a partial equilibrium
version of the Ms model. Instead, they add two extra assumptions, which are nite number of rms within
each sector and hierarchy in good aggregation. There are a continuum (innite number) of sectors in both
home and foreign country. Within each sector, a nite number of rms are selling domestically, and at the
same time making the decision of whether or not to enter the exporting market based on their individual
productivity draw. By hierarchy I mean that each sector produces sectoral output using goods supplied
by all domestic rms and exporting foreign rms in that sector, then agents consume a basket of sectoral
outputs. Only goods produced by rms can be traded international, sectoral output cannot cross over the
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border. Atkeson and Burstein show that deviations from purchasing power parity (henceforth PPP) at the
aggregate level arise as a result of the decisions of individual rms to sell in both home and foreign market
with endogenous pricing-to-market.
PPP theory suggests that producer price index (henceforth PPI) based exchange rates should move iden-
tically with the terms of trade (henceforth TOT), or the ratio of export and import price indices (henceforth
EPI and IPI). It also suggests that uctuations in consumer price index (henceforth CPI) based exchange
rates should be smoother than its PPI based counterpart. Empirical results turn out to be di¤erent from
above traditional PPP theoretical predictions. The truth is that PPI based real exchange rates are more
volatile than TOT, and they are as volatile as their PPI based counterpart. These discrepancies can be ex-
plained by PPP deviations, and the deviations are generated in this model because rms price discriminate
between home and foreign country. When dig deeper, you will nd that the discrimination behavior comes
from endogenous mark-up, which is a direct result from that two extra assumptions they made about nite
rms and hierarchy.
There are two countries home and foreign like GM model. Life time utility of a representative agent
living in home country is all future cobb-douglas combination of consumption and leisure discounted to time
zero.
U =
1X
t=0
t [ lnCt + (1  ) ln(1  Lt)] :
Drop the time subscription for now since I will write down everything happened at some specic time t.
Stationary CES consumption composite C is dened over a continuum of sector-manufactured outputs cj
indexed by j 2 [0; 1] in home country.
C =
Z 1
0
c
 1

j dj
 
 1
:
International trade happens at the rm level, and trade enables foreign rms goods to be used in the
production of sector output at home country. Consider home country, there exist 2K rms in every sector j:
k = 1; 2; ::;K are domestic rms and k = K+1;K+2; :::2K are foreign rms. Each sector j in home country
again employs CES technology to produce output cj using 2K di¤erent goods as inputs with amount qjk
from rm k.
cj =
"
2KX
k=1
q
 1

jk
# 
 1
:
In ABs model, there are no entrance and exit dynamics for domestic rms. Recall the GM model, exogenous
death occurs to domestic rms but free entry ensures stationarity in steady state. In the presence of trade
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barrier, all K domestic rms and some (can be none or all) foreign rms together contribute to the output
in the same sector at home country. Similarly, only part of home originated rms actually export when
opening up to trade. The demand function for sector output j in home country is thus
cj =
pj
P
 
C;
and the demand function for each good k from sector j in home country is
qjk =

pjk
pj
 
cj ;
where pjk is the price of good k, pj is the price index for sectoral output j;
pj =
"
2KX
k=1
p1 jk
# 1
1 
;
and P is the price index for consumption composite at home,
P =
Z 1
0
p1 j dj
 1
1 
:
Only nite rms competing within each sector allows AB model to use oligopoly competition in which
rms take into account the impact they have on the aggregate prices of output in the same sector. At the
sector level, Atkeson and Burstein maintains the assumption of innite di¤erentiated outputs so that all
rms take nal consumption C and the corresponding price index P as given. A natural assumption to make
is that goods are more substitable within sectors than sectoral outputs within nal consumption composite.
1 <  <  <1;
Where  is the elasticity of substitution between sectoral outputs and  is the elasticity of substitution
between goods within the same sector. Suppose the oligopoly competition takes the form of Cournot (rms
simultaneously set quantities), then individual rm takes the amount of good supplied by other rms within
their own sector as given, and choose its own supply quantity to maximize prot. All sectors are assumed to
be symmetric, thus I can drop the subscript j when writing down the production function of rm k in home
country.
qk = zkZlk;
where lk is the labor utilized by rm k, Z is the country-specic aggregate labor productivity as in GM and
zk is rms idiosyncratic draw from a log normal distribution. In general, zk is di¤erent across rms and
xed over time once it is revealed.
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As in GM model, there is no overhead cost for rms to serve domestic market, thus fD = 0. To export,
a rm must incur a xed cost of fx units of labor and a per unit iceberg cost of  : For any rm k; the
marginal cost of a unit sold at home and abroad are WZzk and 
W
Zzk
; respectively. The price in GM model
is a constant mark-up,  1 ; of the rms marginal cost. However, in AB model rm k in sector j at home
country sets its domestic price as a endogenous mark-up of its marginal cost because of Cournot competition
replacing monopolistic competition.
pjk =
"(sk)
"(sk)  1
W
Zzk
;
where
"(sk) =
1
1
 (1  sk) + 1 sk
and sk is the rm ks market share in sector j at home country.
sk =
p1 jk
K+nX
l=1
(pjl)1 
:
n can be any integer from 0 to K: Two extreme cases are: (I) n = 0 means autarky, no foreign rms export
to home country; (II) n = K, all foreign rms export. Any n in between 0 and K says that foreign rms
K;K + 1; ::;K + n from sector j export to home county while other foreign rms K + n + 1; :::; 2K only
serve their domestic market. The cuto¤ n will be determined later by the positive exporting prot condition.
Choose any foreign rm l with l 6 K + n; it exports to home country and sells its goods at price
pjl =
"(sl)
"(sl)  1
W 
Zzl
;
where W  is normalized to 1. Hence the mark-ups both domestic and exporting rms charge are endogenous
because they depend on rmsmarket share s: If  = ; then "(s) = ; the mark-up is the Dixit-Stiglitz
constant one at  1 just like in GM. As s! 1; "(s) = ; the rm controls near 100% market shares in sector
j. The market power it exercises is through its supply to the nal goods sector. On the other hand, if s! 0;
as it would be the case if there were a continuum of rms in each sector, then "(s) = : For any s in between
the two extreme cases, the mark-up is increasing in the rms market share for we have assumed  < :
Domestic prots for rms originated from the home country are as follows,
D = pq   q W
Zz
=
1
"(s)
pq:
In equilibrium some foreign rms in sector j will also be supplying to home countrys production of cj :Who
are these rms? The candidates include rm K+1;K+2; :::;K+n; :::; 2K in sector j in the foreign country.
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Prots from serving home country for all the candidate foreign exporting rms are
X = pq   q W

Zz
 W fX :
If we rank all the K rms in sector j at foreign country by their productivity, i.e., the rm with highest
productivity z is K + 1 and the lowest is 2K: Foreign rms from K + 1 to K + n will export while the rest
of them will not, where the cuto¤ n is determined by
n = max

l : X(K + l) > 0
	
for l = 1; :::;K:
For the problem to be interesting I rule out the autarky case in which none of the K rms from foreign
country exports,5 therefore at least one foreign rm exports in the equilibrium. Surely, if any foreign rm
exports to the home country, it must be the highest productivity rm K + 1.
Assume there is complete risk sharing between the two countries through a full-set of state-contingent
claims. Then the general equilibrium is characterized at every time point t by consumption smoothing in
the world
Ct
Ct
=
P t
Pt
;
and the e¢ cient allocation of labor endowment between leisure and job in household utility maximization is
thus
PtCt
Wt(1  lt) =
P t C

t
W t (1  lt )
=

1  :
Main results are illustrated in ABs paper by calibration, and they are heavily rely on the essence of Ms
model, which is that only a subset of rms export in equilibrium at both countries in the presence of xed
exporting cost and iceberg melting cost. Assume a negative productivity shock a¤ects all rms originated
from home country (for example, a 1% fall in Z).
 With trade costs the domestic market is dominated by domestic rms. Since all domestic rms face
the same increase in marginal cost and only a small share of foreign exporters are not a¤ected, there is
no fear of decline in shares in the domestic market. Things are opposite abroad, where home country
rms exporting to foreign country compete against all una¤ected foreign rms, and only against a
few other domestic exporters. Thus they lose competitiveness abroad than it does at home, and they
further lose market shares in the same sector abroad at foreign county, and therefore raise prices by
5This is possible if the most productive rm among all K foreign rms, no. K+1; lose money when exports to home market,
X(K + 1) < 0:
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the smaller amount than they do it at home. The exporting rms from home country bear part of
the shock by reducing mark-up in order to protect their market share abroad. Endogenous pricing-to-
market appears because rms change di¤erently the price they charge in di¤erent markets when hit by
productivity shocks. With common parameter values, home countrys PPI will increase by 0.86% and
EPI by 0.69%.
[PPI > [EPI:
 Symmetrically, foreign country origin rms exporting to the home country gain market share abroad
and therefore raise prices higher than they do it at home. Thus foreign exporters will increase their
mark-up for exports more than for goods sold domestically at foreign country. Home countrys IPI
increase by 0.31% and foreign countrys PPI increases by 0.14% in respond to a 1% change in home
countrys aggregate productivity. dIPI > \PPI:
 So far, I have discussed the di¤erent price indicesresponds of exporting and non-exporting rms within
one country. On the other hand, I can compare the price index uctuations between home country
who encounters negative shock and una¤ected foreign country. Since foreign rms do not experience
any change in costs, and their price increases are relatively smaller and only due to their expansion in
market share. Home countrys IPI increases by 0.31%.
[EPI > dIPI:
Combining the above three inequalities with the two equations below, which are percentage changes in
PPI based real exchange rate

[PPI
PPI

and percentage changes in TOT

[EPI
IPI

, 
[PPI
PPI
!
'[PPI  \PPI = 0:72%;
 
[EPI
IPI
!
' [EPI   dIPI = 0:38%;
Atkeson and Burstein come to the conclusion that PPI based exchange rate is more volatile than TOT under
productivity shock in their numerical model,
[EPI
IPI


[PPI
PPI
 ' [EPI   dIPI
[PPI  \PPI
= 53:4% < 1:
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In other words, TOT can only explain about half of PPI based exchange rate uctuations. Pricing-to-market
in each country by individual rms accounts for the rest of the movements. As for the second result, CPI
based exchange rates is almost as volatile as its PPI based counterpart, AB rst decompose CPI in both
country in the following way
[CPI = (1  sM )[PPI + sMdIPI;
\CPI = (1  sM )\PPI + sM[EPI;
where sM is the weight assigned to foreign goods price when computing the domestic consumer price index
sM =
Z 1
0
sj
2KX
k=K+1
sjkdj:
Now I can look at the ratio of CPI and PPI based exchange rate uctuations,
[CPI
CPI


[PPI
PPI
 '

[CPI  \CPI


[PPI  \PPI

= (1  sM )  sM

[EPI   dIPI
[PPI  \PPI

= 1  sM
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
[EPI   dIPI
[PPI  \PPI
 + 1
35
= 82:3%
CPI based exchange rate explains a large portion of PPI based exchange rate uctuations, thus they move
together roughly. Both of the above two theoretical predictions are consistent with real world data.
2.3 Innovation and Growth
After dealing with New New Trade Theorys application on international relative price movements, I now dive
into growth literature and see what implications Ms model has when we augment it with innovating rms.
Consider the closed economy version of the Ms model where each entering rm draws its productivity from
an exogenously given distribution H(z). I abstract from knowledge spillover in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud
(2008) so that there exists no independent innovation sector, instead each surviving rm is an productivity
innovating entity. Every period, rm can choose to invest in research and improve its productivity in the
following binary way. For a rm with current productivity z, investing zc(a) units of labor in research implies
that the rm will have a productivity of z + ' with probability a and have no technological breakthrough
18
(stay with the current productivity z) with probability 1  a. To improve its chance a of achieving a higher
productivity, the rm must invest a higher amount. Therefore, R&D cost c(a) is assumed to be increasing
and convex. For simplicity, I replace the research cost function in Atkeson and Burstein (2009) with my
speicication. Let
c(a) =
a
1  a:
Notice that I maintain the key features of process innovation in Atkeson and Burstein (2009). The rst
feature is that innovation outcome is stochastic and the other feature is that rms already di¤er in their
initial productivity before innovation opportunity arises. Surviving rms are now going to solve the following
dynamic program
v(z) = max
a

D(z)  zc(a) + (1  ) [av(z + ') + (1  a)v(z)]	 ;
where D(z) and fD are rms net prots and overhead cost for producing domestically, respectively, as in
the Ms model. v(z) summarizes the value of having current productivity z: It is implied that rms with
productivity below zmin exit and therefore the zero domestic value condition is
v(zmin) = 0;
where zmin has the same meaning as Ms model in the above section 2.1.
The above dynamic program further implies that the policy function will map productivities to research
costs: a(z). The stationarity will require that the measure of rms at every z remain constant, i.e.,
Ng(z) = NEh(z) + (1  )N [a(z   ')g(z   ') + (1  a(z)) g(z)] ;
where all notation other than that technological breakthrough probability a related to research follow from
Ms Model in the above section 2.1.
In the model of Atkeson and Burstein (2009), rms have productivity dynamics due to innovation option
but exit and export decisions are independent of size. Their central nding is that, despite the fact that a
change in trade costs can have a substantial impact on individual rmsexit, export, and process innovation
decisions, the rms free-entry condition places a constraint on the overall response of aggregate produc-
tivity to the change in trade costs. In particular, after they solve the numerical model with parameterized
specications, they show that the steady-state response of product innovation largely o¤ sets the impact of
changes in rmsexit, export, and process innovation decisions on aggregate productivity. They also nd
that the dynamic welfare gains from a reduction in trade costs are very similar to the welfare gains that
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arise directly from the reduction in trade costs. Although the microeconomic evidence on individual rms
response to changes in international trade costs may account for international relative price uctuation and
co-movements as in the above two sections, it may not be informative about the macroeconomic implications
of changes in these trade costs for aggregate productivity, growth and welfare.
3 Traditional Trade Theory
Unlike the New Trade Theory, traditional school of trade theory says that country trades because they are
di¤erent in nature, either their technologies to produce each good di¤er in the Ricardian models, or their
factor endowments di¤er like in H-O models. Both models result in a situation of comparative advantage,
and lead to a partial or a complete specialization. In section 3.1, I introduce early e¤orts in making Ricardian
and H-O models dynamic before the emergence of New New Trade Theory with heterogeneous rms. After
Ms model, researchers add into traditional trade theory with the ingredient that rms possess heterogeneous
productivity. This strand of literature is initiated by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and will be discussed in
section 3.2. It represents a competing class of models with Ms New New Trade Theory. I also compare New
New Trade Theory models built on New Trade Theory assumptions and their counterpart that incorporating
New New Trade Theory feature in a traditional trade theory framework. Finally, in section 3.3, I mention
other schools of thoughts linking international trade ows and macroeconomic phenomena.
3.1 Early E¤orts
Early attempts to add dynamic features in traditional trade models fall short in open macroeconomic impli-
cations. The reason might be the ad-hoc assumptions these early papers have made in order to get dynamic
results. Redding (1999) assumes learning by doing in a Ricardian model where labor technology in one sector
evolves faster overtime just because more labor is used in that sector. Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) assume
that one of the two traded goods is investment goods, which is not edible and only useful in creating new
capital every period.
The simple Ricardian model depicts a world of two countries, home and foreign, each using a single factor
labor to produce two goods, c and x. Technology is linear and di¤erent in two countries, meaning that home
(foreign) country can produce one unit of good c (x) by Ac (Ax) units of labor. Redding use the basic model
to dene the dynamic comparative advantages. In the augmented Ricardian model by Reddig (1997) with
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productivity dynamics, A0s in each of the two sectors evolve endogenously over time as learning by doing
occurs. The paper denotes time by t innite and continuous. Preferences of consumers are identical in both
home and foreign countries
U =
Z 1
t=0
e tu(ct; xt)dt;
where period utility u takes the form of cobb-douglas specication
u(ct; xt) = c

tx
1 
t :
c and x are low and high technology goods, respectively. Labor is the only production factor needed, and
home country is populated with L units of labor while foreign country with L. The labor used in industry
c and x must add up to the total labor supply, Lc(t) + Lx(t) = L: Productivity is denoted as
Time t Home Foreign
Goods c Ac(t) Ax(t)
Goods x Ac(t) Ax(t)
;
where Aj(t) =  jKj(t) and A

j (t) =  

jK

j (t) for j = c; x: Production functions in home country (symmet-
rically in foreign country) is thus
Qj = Aj(t)Lj(t) for j = c; x:
Productivity dynamics in home country comes from knowledge evolvement, whose evolving rule is specied
as

Kj(t) = jLj(t)Kj(t); j > 0 for j = c; x:
The pattern of trade at any time t is determined by the static comparative advantage. Thus, home country
is said to have a static comparative advantage in the low-tech sector c at time t if the opportunity cost of
producing the low-tech good at home is lower than in the other economy,
Ax(t)
Ac(t)
<
Ax(t)
Ac(t)
:
The main result of this paper is that developing economies (home country in the model) may face a trade-o¤
between specializing according to existing static comparative advantage (in low-technology goods c), and
entering sectors in which they currently lack a comparative advantage, but may acquire such an advantage
in the future as a result of the potential for productivity growth (in high-technology goods x). Comparative
advantage is endogenously determined by past technological change, while simultaneously shaping current
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rates of innovation. Hence, specialization according to current static comparative advantage under free trade
is welfare reducing. Trade policy intervention may be welfare improving, both for the economy undertaking
it, and for its trade partner. In conclusion, productivity evolvement induced by labor input helps explain
trade pattern changes, welfare improvement and aggregate productivity growth in the long run, but it has
little power in addressing short term uctuations in open macroeconomics.
Unlike the Ricardian trade model emphasizing on di¤erences in production technology, H-O model family
features in di¤erences in factor endowment. Atkeson and Kehoe (2000)s model discuss a dynamic version
of H-O model in which they turn one of the tradable goods from consumption basket into investment goods.
Through investment goods, countries can build up the stock of capital used in goods production. As a result,
countries in their paper are di¤ered in the timing of development. In other words, they di¤er in the size
of capital stock, thus di¤erent capital abundance at time t as in static H-O models. Time is innite and
continuous. Preferences of consumers are identical across country
U =
Z 1
t=0
e tu(ct)dt:
Technology takes the form of constant return to scale production function. For consumption goods c and
investment goods x; respectively, 8><>: Qc = Fc (Kc; Lc)Qx = Fx(Kx; Lx) :
It is easier if we proceed with intensive form8><>: qc = fc(kc)lcqx = fx(kx)lx ;
where kj =
Kj
Lj
; lj =
Lj
L and qj =
Qj
L for j = c; x: They assume that investment goods x are more capital
intensive than consumption goods c; kx > kc; which means there will be no factor intensity reversals.
Resource constraints in this economy are 8><>: kxlx + kclc = klx + lc = 1 ;
where k = KL and K and L are home countrys endowment of capital and labor. As you can see, capital is
not sector specic in this model. Capital accumulation over time is governed by the following evolving rule

k = x  k;
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where x is the investment and  is the depreciation rate. Consumers in each country trade consumption and
investment goods, taking as given the time path for p, the world price of the investment good relative to the
consumption good. Assume that trade for each country is balanced at each date, so that c + px = rk + w,
where r is the rental rate on capital and w is the wage rate in that country. Accordingly, the representative
consumer in each country chooses time paths for consumption and capital to maximize life time utility
subject to

k = (rk + w   c)=p  k
with k > 0: Firms in each country maximize
fc(kc)lc + pfx(kx)lx   r(kclc + kxlx)  w(lc + lx):
As for the main results, they show that in a dynamic H-O model the timing of a countrys development
relative to the rest of the world a¤ects the path of the countrys development. A late-bloomer country that
begins the development process later than most of the rest of the world ends up with a permanently lower
level of income than the early-bloomers that developed earlier. This is true even though the late-bloomer has
the same preferences, technology, and initial capital stock that the early-bloomers had when they started the
process of development. This result stands in contrast to that of the standard one-sector growth model in
which identical countries converge to a unique steady state, regardless of when they start to develop. Adding
dynamic feature makes the history matter here.
3.2 Melitz Meets Traditional Trade Theory
Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977, henceforth DFS) examine a continuum of goods rst in a Ricardian
model. Their key idea is to span goods on a unit interval, and thus summarize the endogenous equilibrium
specialization pattern by two cuto¤ values (pivotal goods) dening the set of goods that are produced only
by country 1 and the set of goods that are produced only by country 2. However, the model is constrained
to two countries and is di¢ cult to extend to a multi-country framework in full generality until Eaton and
Kortums parameterization. Eaton and Kortum (2002) extend DFS to a probabilistic technology distribution
of countries (rms) and incorporate ingenious and elegant treatment of geography into a Ricardian model
to study gravity equations. Alvarez and Lucas (2007) later perform a general equilibrium analysis of Eaton-
Kortum model by generating the input goods market, and they use it to nd out whether the cross-country
distribution of trade volumes is consistent with the behavior of volumes in the data.
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Based on DFSs continuum version of Ricardian model, Eaton and Kortum (2002) add heterogeneous
productivity ingredients from New Trade Theory in a way that they keep the CES preferences assumption,
but instead remove the monopolistic competition assumption for perfect competition. Perfect competition
actually gives results that are almost identical to monopolistic competition: instead of all rms charging a
constant Dixit-Stiglitz mark-up over their marginal cost in monopolistic competition, they charge exactly
their marginal cost. The following two paragraphs revisit the environment of Eaton and Kortums model,
then propose one way (at primitive stage) to make it dynamic. A continuum of goods indexed by ! 2

  [0; 1]: Country is e¢ ciency in producing good ! is denoted as usual by zi(!): Price of one unit of
good ! produced in country i and sold in country n is thus pni(!) = cizi(!)ni; where ci is the input cost
in country i and for any good !; ni denotes the units required to produce in country i when delivering
one unit from country i to country n. Under the assumption of perfect competition, buyers in country n
compare the prices o¤ered by all countries and actually buy from the lowest price available. The lowest
price pni(!) = min fpni(!) : i = 1; :::; Ng ; where N is the number of countries. Consumers maximize a CES
utility
C =
Z 1
0
c(!)
 1
 d!
 
 1
:
The e¢ ciency of producing each good ! in country i is draw independently from Type II extreme value
distribution:
Fi(z) = Pr[Zi  z] = e Tiz  :
For any good !; the price distribution of ! produced in country i and shipped to country n is thus:
Gni(p) = Pr[Pni  p]
= 1  e Ti(cini) p :
The price distribution of ! country n actually buys is:
Gn(p) = Pr[Pn  p]
= 1 
YN
i=1
[1 Gni(p)]
= 1  e np ;
where n =
PN
i=1 [Ti(cini)
 ] : This happens to be the same as the price distribution of ! which country
n actually buys from country i computed in a di¤erent way. Notice it is the same for any country i:
gni(p) =
1
ni
Z p
q=0
Q
s 6=i
[1 Gns(q)]dGni(q) = Gn(p);
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where ni =
Ti(cini)
 
n
; the probability that country i provides variety ! at the lowest price in country n:
It can also be referred as the fraction of goods that country n actually buys from country i: Suppose the
average expenditure per good in country n is Xn because gni(p) = Gn(p) does not vary by source country i.
Notice that this is also the total spending of country n since there is a continuum of goods normalized to 1:
The spending of country n on goods from i is denoted as Xni = Xn  ni. We can get
Xni
Xn
= ni =
Ti(cini)
 
n
=
Ti(cini)
 PN
i=1 [Ti(cini)
 ]
:
The above expression bears semblance to the standard gravity equation in that bilateral trade is related to
the importers total expenditure and to geographic barriers. Other justications for a gravity equation have
rested on the traditional Armington and monopolistic competition models. Under the Armington assumption
goods produced by di¤erent sources are inherently imperfect substitutes by virtue. Under monopolistic
competition each country chooses to specialize in a distinct set of goods. The more substitutable are goods
from di¤erent countries, the higher is the sensitivity of trade to production costs and geographic barriers. In
such models, adjustment is at the intensive margin: Higher costs or geographic barriers leave the set of goods
that are traded una¤ected, but less is spent on each imported good. In contrast, in Eaton and Kortums
model the sensitivity of trade to costs and geographic barriers depends on the technological parameter
 (reecting the heterogeneity of goods in production) rather than the preference parameter  (reecting
the heterogeneity of goods in consumption). Trade shares respond to costs and geographic barriers at the
extensive margin: As a source becomes more expensive or remote it exports a narrower range of goods.
Here are some primitive thoughts to make Eaton and Kortum (2002) dynamic. For simplicity, I reduce
the number of country to two. Consumers now have intertemporal choices to make:
U = Et
" 1X
t=0
tu(Ct)
#
;
where the period utility is the same as before
Ct =
Z 1
0
ct(!)
 1
 d!
 
 1
:
Since there are only two countries, we can drop the subscript i: The production e¢ cient draws in home
(foreign) country could now be related to each other or/and to their own histories through a country-specic
technological shock Zt (Zt ).
Ft(z) = e
 ZtTz  :
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Price of one unit of goods ! produced in foreign country and sold in home country at time t is thus
pXt (!) =
ct
zt (!)
 compared to the home market goods price at pDt (!) =
ct
zt(!)
: Then it is possible to study
international relative price uctuations as in GM model. More works need to be done from this point on.
Instead of Melitzs monopolistic competition between rms and Eaton and Kortums perfect competition
between countries, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003, BEJK henceforth) consider Bertrand com-
petition between heterogeneous rms in the same industry, and the winning rm represents the country to
compete perfectly with other countries. With Bertrand competition, once heterogeneous rms compete in
prices of identical goods, since the price they charge depends on the pricing rules of their direct competitors,
mark-ups will endogenously respond to changes in the toughness of competition, which will be the case when
countries open up to trade. At this point, the BEJK model which builds on traditional Ricardian trade
model plus heterogeneous feature merges with AB model which is grounded on New Trade Theory. Atkeson
and Burstein (2008) model is a more generalized version of BEJK model if one imagines the sector in AB as
the variety ! in BEJK. Both models have domestic and foreign rms competing in the same sector (variety)
according to Counrnot (Bertrand) rules. Within sector goods are perfect substitutes (they are actually iden-
tical) in BEJK so that BEJK simply corresponds to the extreme case where  = +1 is section 2.2: In the
extreme case (BEJK), rm charges a cost equal to the marginal cost of the second lowest cost in the variety
so that it does not have to worry about competition from other varieties. However, AB has an intermediate
case where both the competition of rms within the sector and of rms in other sectors always matters.
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) put New New Trade Theory into a factor endowment H-O model. In
a general equilibrium framework, they characterize how country, industry and rm characteristics interact
and respond to trade liberalization. When rms possess heterogeneous productivity, countries di¤er in
relative factor abundance and industries vary in factor intensity, falling trade costs induce reallocations
of resources both within and across industries and countries. These reallocations generate substantial job
turnover in all sectors, spur relatively more creative destruction in comparative advantage industries than
comparative disadvantage industries, and magnify ex ante comparative advantage to create additional welfare
gains from trade. The improvements in aggregate productivity as countries liberalize dampen and can even
reverse the real wage losses of scarce factors.
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3.3 Other Thoughts
Dynamics in trade is also found in international ows of ideas. It is inspired by the second wave of glob-
alization from 1960 to present, in which international ows in goods was accompanied by ows of ideas.
Eaton and Kortum (1999) and (2006) show that, to some extent, technology di¤usion substitutes for trade
in goods. Knowledge accumulation and patent protected spillover provide incentive for innovation and
aggregate productivity growth.
All the above researches on international trade pattern focus on deep primitive causes of trade, such
as di¤erence in technology in Ricardian model, national factor endowment in H-O model, love of variety
preferences in New Trade Theory model, heterogeneous rms in New New Trade Theory model or invent
and patent mechanism in Trade in Ideas model. And such trade patterns give rise to various macroeco-
nomic phenomena. However, macroeconomic behaviors of countries can sometimes, the other way around,
determine the pattern of international trade.
In the study of Rose and Spiegel (2002), monetary union stimulates trade and multilateral trade system
has strong e¤ect on trade too.
First brought up by Bulow and rogo¤ (1989) and most recently developed by Mendoza and Yue (2008),
trade models with sovereign debt default in equilibrium a¤ect trade in a dynamic way. Specically, sovereign
debts repayment and default over time could determine the volume of international trade. Creditor countries
might threaten to damage debtor countriestrade in the case of default. Because there is risk of losing benets
from international trade, this kind of threat provides debtor countries incentive to repay. However, default
in equilibrium would lead to a smaller trade size than it will be in a full risk sharing environment without
commitment problem.
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